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CORPORATIONS - SHAREHOLDERS - DELEGATION OF DIRECTOR'S PRINCIPAL 
DUTIES INSUFFICIENT TO INVALIDATE A VOTING TRUST-The directors of an 
intermediate unit in a string of holding companies caused the corporation's 
sole substantial asset, the stock representing control of a subordinate hold-
ing company, to be deposited in a voting trust. Most of these directors, 
serving one-year terms, comprised the majority of the trustees who were to 
serve for the life of the ten-year trust. This act served to insulate the lower 
companies from the control of plaintiffs who were majority shareholders 
of the top holding company. The plaintiffs sought an injunction restrain-
ing the use by the trustees of the stock controlled by the trust to effect a 
merger of Theodore Gary and Co., one of the lower controlled companies, 
with General Telephone Co., the largest independent telephone company 
in the nation,1 and asked for the invalidation of the voting trust. Disre-
garding the stated purpose for the trust, i.e., the maintenance of manage-
ment stability to aid the refinancing of a lower company, the plaintiffs 
charged that the delegation of duties by the directors and the resulting 
self-perpetuation of control were conditions which should invalidate the 
voting trust. The Delaware Court of Chancery denied plaintiff's motion 
for injunctive relief. On appeal, held, affirmed. Absent a showing of abuse 
or fraud by the directors, the delegation of principal duties and possibility 
of extended control via the trust instrument are not conditions sufficient 
to invalidate an otherwise lawful voting trust. Adams v. Clearance Corp., 
(Del. 1956) 121 A. (2d) 302. 
Voting trusts have outlived the stigma earlier attached to them and are 
now, by decision or legislation, generally recognized as valid instruments 
1 Plaintiff's interests, by reason of the merger, were cast in a minority role in the re-
sulting company. 
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of corporate management.2 The requirement of a lawful purpose is the 
principal limitation on the use of such trusts today,3 and because of the 
lack of affirmative guidance by the statutes,4 the validity of a particular 
trust seems to depend on the reviewing court's view of "lawful purpose" and 
wise "public policy."5 Insofar as the instant case recognized the validity of 
a voting trust where no fraudulent purpose has been revealed, it does not 
seem vulnerable to attack; but it does pose a question of the extent to 
which a court will hold other conditions insufficient to invalidate the 
trust. Among "other grounds" for invalidation which have been employed 
are statutory compliance requirements which test the necessary degree of 
adherence to the terms of the corporation laws.6 Voting trusts which con-
template a period of duration exceeding that permitted by statute (usually 
ten years) may be declared void.7 Likewise, the policy against restrictions 
on alienation of trust certificates has led to the abrogation of othenvise 
sound voting trusts.8 A voting trust has been approved, however, even 
where the use made by the trustees of corporate funds would have been an 
ultra vires act if done by the corporation,o and apparently avoidance of the 
effects of governmental regulation is sufficiently compatible with the "pub-
lic policy" favoring voting trusts to escape criticism.10 In the principal 
case the court was required to choose between the policy against delegation 
2 See Mannheimer v. Keehn, 41 N.Y.S. (2d) 542 at 548 (1943). See generally LEAvrrr, 
THE VOTING TRUST (1940); 105 A.L.R. 123 (1936); 28 GEO. L. J. 1121 (1940). For resume 
of leading articles tracing the growth of the voting trust, see Giles, "Is the Voting Trust 
Agreement a Dangerous Instrumentality?" 3 CATH. L. REv. 81 (1953). 
3 See 105 A.L.R. 123 at 129 (1936); 5 FLETCHER, Cvc. CoRP., perm. ed., §2081 (1952). 
Ballentine in "Voting Trusts, Their Abuses and Regulation,'' 21 TEX. L. REv. 139 at 152 
(1942), lists various lawful purposes. 
4 See Ballentine, "Voting Trusts, Their Abuses and Regulation,'' 21 TEX. L. REv. 
139 at 157 (1942). See also 42 !LL. L. REv. 401 (1947). 
5 See Herman v. Dereszewski, 312 Mich. 244, 20 N.W. (2d) 176 (1945); Boericke v. 
Weise, 68 Cal. App. (2d) 407, 156 P. (2d) 781 (1945). 
6 Leading case on strict compliance is Matter of Morse, 247 N.Y. 290, 160 N.E. 374 
(1928). But see Herman v. Derezewski, note 5 supra. For excellent discussion see 44 MICH. 
L. REv. 1048 (1946). On extension failure see Belle Isle Corp. v. Corcoran, 29 Del. Ch. 
554, 49 A. (2d) 1 (1946), but see Oppenheimer v. Cassidy, 345 Ill. App. 212, 102 N.E. 
(2d) 678 (1951). 
7 The entire trust may be void, Perry v. Mo.-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 22 Del. Ch. 33, 
191 A. 823 (1937); partially invalid, Kittinger v. Churchill Evangelistic Assn., 151 Misc. 350, 
271 N.Y.S. 510 (1934); or perhaps valid for statutory period and thereafter common law 
limitations govern, 25 CoL. L. REv. 95I (1925). Cf. Boyle v. John M. Smyth Co., 248 Ill. 
App. 57 (1929) (possible fifty-year period approved). 
8 Tracey v. Franklin, 30 Del. Ch. 407, 61 A. (2d) 780 (1948), affd. 31 Del. Ch. 477, 67 A. 
(2d) 56 (1949). For the suggestion that a reasonable suspension incidental to the voting 
trust would be valid see 16 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 742 (1949). However, when incidental 
to the maintenance of constant management, restrictions allowing a transfer with a waiver 
of voting rights may not be fatal to the arrangement, see Trefethen v. Amazeen, 93 N.H. 
110, 36 A. (2d) 266 (1944). 
9 Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897 (1935) (good faith controlling). 
10 See Aldridge v. Franco Wyoming Oil Co., 24 Del. Ch. 126, 7 A. (2d) 753 (1939); 
affd. 24 Del. Ch. 349, 14 A. (2d) 380 (1940); Byllesby Co. v. Doriot, 25 Del. Ch. 46, 12 A. 
(2d) 603 (1940). 
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of directors' principal duties11 · and legislation permitting the use of voting 
trusts12 and relied upon its interpretation of public policy in recognizing 
the superiority of the voting trust statute where its application was not 
tainted with fraud.13 The decision is an example of the extreme lengths 
to which a particular court's view of sound public policy can be carried to 
justify a desire to continue present management.14 It would seem that the 
purpose of the holding company, i.e., whether nominal or real control is 
contemplated, and the nature of the duties delegated, i.e., whether they are 
ministerial in nature or require the exercise of considerable discretion, 
should be strong considerations in fixing boundaries for the valid use of 
such voting trusts.15 Notwithstanding the disturbance surrounding the duty 
delegation issue and the sophisticated view taken on the lesser important 
self-perpetuation aspect,16 the court's approach in the principal case is not 
shocking in the context of liberal modem treatment of voting trusts, and 
the decision is understandable as a result of inadequate guidance by the 
legislature. Appeals for comprehensive statutory treatment which would 
assure more complete protection and furnish affirmative policy guidance 
in voting trust cases have been numerous.11 Piecemeal judicial legislation, 
a less desirable alternative, has proved itself unsatisfactorily cumbersome in 
the voting trust area. Until aid from the legislature is forthcoming, little 
more should be expected from the courts in the way of judicial limitations 
than those based on fraud or other specifically illegal purposes. 
Gerald D. Rapp 
11 "The business of every corporation • . • shall be managed by a board of directors . 
• . . " Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §141 (a). 
12 ". • • stockholders may • • • deposit capital stock . . • with or transfer . . . to . • • 
any person ••. authorized to act as trustee •.. the right to vote .... " Del. Code A~n. 
(1953) tit. 8, §218 (a). 
13 But cf. Knickerbocker Inv. Co. v. Voorhees, 100 App. Div. 414, 91 N.Y.S. 816 (1905), 
distinguished in the principal case. 
14 Cf. Ecclestone v. Indialantic, Inc., 319 Mich. 248, 29 N.W. (2d) 679 (1947); 47 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 547 (1949); 61 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1062 (1948) (permitting, without the aid of a 
trust, the divorce of voting rights from legal and equitable ownership to preserve constant 
management). 
15 For criticism of the court's decision in the principal case, see 69 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1321 
(1956); 104 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 712 (1956). 
16 Cf. Boyle v. John M. Smyth Co., note 7 supra. 
17 LEAvrrr, THE VOTING Tuusr 159-180 (1940); Ballentine, "Voting Trusts, Their 
Abuses and Regulation," 21 Tm.:. L. R.Ev. 139 (1942); Giles, "Is the Voting Trust Agree-
ment a Dangerous Instrumentality?" 3 CAm. L. R.Ev. 81 (1953). 
